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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Financial market failures can be attributed in large part to three causes: conflicts, 
complacency, and complexity. An important subset of that first cause—conflicts—is 
the conf licted trustee. Investment securities are almost always held by multiple 
investors. Even if investors have voting power to make decisions, the practical 
difficulty of soliciting investor votes or sorting out sometimes-conflicting investor 
directions means, in reality, that many important decisions are inevitably made by a 
trustee or other agent (collectively, a “trustee”) acting for the investors. This essay 
outlines the problem and concludes by asking a number of questions about the proper 
role of a trustee that require further attention in order to address financial crises.
 A trustee acting for multiple investors can face difficult challenges even where 
the investors are of a single, non-conflicting class. If the securities are in default and 
the trustee is a deep pocket, investors may try to impose liability on the trustee for 
decisions that, viewed in retrospect, can arguably be deemed questionable or ill-
advised. This poses a dilemma: after default, many decisions, such as whether to 
accelerate debt or liquidate collateral, require exquisite judgment calls, and, ex-ante, 
no given decision may be clearly right. Indenture trustees representing public 
bondholders often face this type of dilemma.1
 The dilemma rises to a much higher order of magnitude, though, where investors 
themselves have conflicting interests, such as divergent priorities or disparate sources 
of payment. Then, the trustee is not only second-guessed for decisions that are 
essentially judgment calls, but also faces the difficult task of understanding and 
balancing the interests of conf licting classes, sometimes called “tranches,” of 
investors. By vastly increasing the volume of debt securities in default, the financial 
crisis has brought this “conflicted trustee” dilemma to the fore. The dilemma has 
also been magnified by the numerous conf licting classes of securities that have 
become typical in mortgage-backed and other types of securitization. For example, 
so-called collateralized-debt-obligation transactions customarily involve a dozen or 
more conflicting classes of securities, all backed by the same pools of underlying 
mortgage loans and other financial assets.
 To understand the conflicted trustee dilemma, consider actual scenarios in which 
the conflict arises. One such scenario involves the dilemma of realizing value on the 
financial assets underlying the securities. A trustee, usually referred to in this context 
as a servicer, is customarily employed to perform this role for the investors, agreeing 
to act in their “best interests.” This standard gives little guidance, though, when, as 
commonly occurs, cash f lows deriving from principal and interest on the underlying 
assets are separately allocated to different investor classes. Say, for example, the 
underlying assets are mortgage loans, and the servicer needs to restructure one or 
more defaulted loans to maximize overall recovery to investors. A decision by the 
servicer to restructure the loans by reducing the interest rate would adversely affect 
investors in the interest-only class; conversely, a decision by the servicer to restructure 
1. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 
Ala. L. Rev. 1037 (2008) (focusing on the trustee’s collective-action problem).
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the loans by reducing principal would adversely affect investors in the principal-only 
class. In either case, a restructuring is likely to spark what some have called “tranche 
warfare.”2 As a result, servicers are not restructuring mortgages but, instead, are 
simply foreclosing on homes, making people destitute and creating the blight of 
abandoned homes that is feeding the current financial crisis.3
 The conflicted trustee dilemma also can arise when investors have conflicting 
views on how the trustee, after default, should exercise remedies against collateral. 
Consider a relatively simple case, where a class of senior investors and a class of 
subordinated investors are secured by the same collateral. In deciding whether and 
how to exercise remedies, the collateral trustee should attempt to balance the interests 
of the senior and subordinated investors. There is little guidance, though, on how 
that balancing should occur.
 The English High Court of Justice recently was faced with such a conflict in Bank 
of New York v. Montana Board of Investments, in which Orion Finance Corporation, a 
huge structured investment vehicle, defaulted on its payment obligations to senior 
investors.4 With billions of dollars at stake, the senior investors wanted the trustee to 
foreclose on the collateral (consisting of financial assets), which at the then-collapsed 
market prices would have yielded barely enough money to repay the senior investors, 
leaving nothing for subordinated investors. Such action could have severely compromised 
the financial condition, and possibly the ultimate viability, of the two large (and, in the 
interest of not harming their reputations, unnamed) financial institutions that held the 
subordinated securities. The subordinated investors, instead, wanted the trustee to 
delay foreclosure, hoping to be repaid (or at least to receive some recovery) from a 
subsequent rise in prices of the underlying financial assets or from collections on those 
assets. Neither the applicable collateral documents (in this case, a security agreement 
governed by New York law) nor the applicable foreclosure law (the New York Uniform 
Commercial Code) provided the trustee with clear answers.
 Similar types of conflicts can arise in any default scenario involving a trustee acting 
for classes of securities that have differing priorities or sources of payment. Furthermore, 
as I’ll show, the rise of hedge funds and distressed-debt investing can, de facto, cause a 
dilemma even where the trustee acts for a single class of pari passu securities.
ii. anaLYsis
 Let’s consider two scenarios: one where the conf licted trustee receives no 
directions from investors and the other where directions are in fact received. Let’s 
also focus on the simple example of two classes of conflicting investors: one senior 
and the other subordinated. Although the existence of additional classes of investors 
with conflicting priorities would exacerbate the conflict, it should not fundamentally 
change the nature of the conflicted trustee’s duties.
2. E.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course 
Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503, 562–63 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, So Many Foreclosures, So Little Logic, N.Y. Times, Jul. 5, 2009, at BU1.
4. [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594. I was an expert in this case as to matters of New York trust and commercial law.
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 A. The Conflicted Trustee Without Investor Directions
 In general, once the security is in default, the Trust Indenture Act, New York 
trust law, and the Restatement of Trusts require the trustee to act as a “prudent man” 
in like circumstances.5 Presumably, because the trustee acts for both classes of 
investors, it will have to balance their interests. But how should a prudent man 
accomplish such balancing? The answer is not obvious.
 In similar circumstances, the law governing gratuitous trusts imposes a duty of 
impartiality on a trustee acting for beneficiaries who, as among themselves, have 
conflicting interests.6 The trustee then must “deal impartially” with the beneficiaries.7 
A duty of impartiality can work for gratuitous trusts because the trustee can resolve 
conflicts by reference to the intentions of the settlor of the trust. It is much less 
obvious, though, that such a duty makes sense in a commercial context where there 
is no settlor and the conflicting beneficiaries are aggressively seeking repayment.
 In this context, we might examine the somewhat analogous duties of a corporation’s 
board of directors to shareholders and creditors. If the corporation is solvent, the board’s 
duty is solely to maximize shareholders’ value because a solvent company is able to pay 
its creditors. However, when the corporation is insolvent—and possibly also when it is 
near insolvency—that duty may shift to balance shareholder and creditor interests. To 
what extent, if any, should a conflicted trustee’s duty after default similarly shift? And 
what would that shift mean in practice? However one answers these questions, 
complying with the prudent-man standard requires judgment calls that can potentially 
expose the conflicted trustee to liability. Such a threat might influence a trustee to act 
in a manner that minimizes its liability, as opposed to acting in the best interests of the 
investors—as evidenced by the tendency (discussed above) of servicers to foreclose on, 
rather than to restructure, defaulted mortgages. It also might deter competent 
institutions from acting as trustees.
 What can the trustee do to minimize its exposure? Some trustees are seeking 
opinions of counsel affirming that the action to be taken is authorized and permitted 
notwithstanding any harm to junior investors. These opinions, though, are not always 
forthcoming from counsel.8 Furthermore, even where they are forthcoming, it is 
incongruous, if not questionable, that a purely legal opinion would satisfy a decision 
that involves mixed business and legal considerations. Some trustees are seeking 
additional indemnification, though that might not be enforceable and would not 
5. Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (2006); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Duty of 
Prudence § 77(1) (2007); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 126(1) (McKinney 2009). 
6. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Duty of Impartiality; Income Productivity § 79 (2007) 
(discussing this rule in the context of the conflicting interests of an income beneficiary and a remainder 
beneficiary).
7. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Duty of Impartiality; Income Productivity § 79 (2007) (“A 
trustee has a duty to administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with respect to the various 
beneficiaries of the trust . . . .”).
8. Doneene Damon, Statement at the Meeting of the Comm. on Trust Indentures & Indenture Trustees, 
Annual Meeting of the Am. Bar Ass’n Bus. Law Section (Apr. 18, 2009).
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address reputational considerations.9 Others are seeking declaratory judgments, 
though U.S. courts are often reluctant to grant them and, in any event, the declaratory 
judgment process can be expensive and time consuming.10
 Should more be done to limit liability for conflicted trustees who attempt in 
good faith to comply with the prudent-man standard? In the context of trustees 
acting for non-conflicting classes of investors, I have argued that limiting trustee 
liability through a business-judgment-type rule would actually improve trustee 
performance under the prudent-man standard because trustees would then be more 
likely to exercise independent judgment.11 It is worth examining whether a similar 
limitation on liability would improve the performance of conflicted trustees.
 Next consider the more dramatic dilemma of a trustee who is conf licted by 
directions from a senior class to act in a way that will harm a subordinated class.
 B. The Conflicted Trustee with Investor Directions
 In some cases, the agreement governing the trustee will purport to empower a class 
of investors, typically the senior class, to direct the trustee after a default occurs. In the 
Bank of New York case, for example, the senior class claimed that it had the post-default 
power to direct the collateral trustee to foreclose on the collateral.12 This can create a 
conflict between the interests of the class giving directions and other classes.
 A similar conflict can arise even where the trustee acts for a single class of pari 
passu securities. With the rise of hedge funds as distressed-debt investors, one or 
more such funds may become majority investors in a particular class of securities. In 
some cases, these funds have attempted to privately negotiate exchange offers with 
the issuer of the securities, intending to gain an advantage over other investors in 
their class. Regardless of how the conflict between investors arises, the fundamental 
issues concerning the trustee are the same. Therefore, for purposes of analysis, let us 
again assume two classes—one senior, the other subordinated—but now with the 
senior class having post-default power to direct the trustee.
 The law regarding the enforceability of a contractual right to direct a trustee has 
developed almost exclusively with gratuitous trusts. In this context, the Restatement 
of Trusts provides that if the terms of a trust
confer upon [someone other than the trustee] a power to direct or otherwise 
control conduct of the trustee, the trustee has a duty to . . . comply with any 
exercise of that power, unless . . . the trustee knows or has reason to believe 
9. Harold L. Kaplan & Mark F. Hebbeln, Keeping a Level Playing Field: The Evolution of Discriminatory 
Consent Solicitations and Exchange Offers, Am. Bankers Assoc. Tr. & Investments, Mar.–Apr. 2008, 
at 44, 50–52.
10. Id.
11. Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 1, at 1073 (“[A]pplying a business judgment rule to indenture trustees will 
lower the cost of public debt while, at the same time, provide public bondholders with greater, not less, 
protection.”).
12. See Bank of N.Y., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594 at ¶¶ 41, 44.
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that the attempted exercise violates a fiduciary duty that the power holder 
owes to the beneficiaries.13
The power holder may itself be a beneficiary, as in the case of the senior class 
directing the trustee.
 One would think that senior investors do not generally have fiduciary duties to 
subordinated investors. If so, it would appear that a conf licted trustee would be 
required to comply with otherwise contractually valid directions of the senior 
investors. The Restatement of Trusts, however, makes the answer more complex (and 
somewhat circular) by providing that, except as discussed below, the power holder (in 
our case, the senior class) is subject to the same fiduciary duty to other beneficiaries 
as is the trustee—and the trustee, of course, has a fiduciary duty to the subordinated 
class.14 A power holder is not, however, subject to the trustee’s fiduciary duty to other 
beneficiaries if the “power [is] granted for the sole benefit of a designated power 
holder[.]”15 Whether that is the case will “depend upon trust language and all relevant 
circumstances,” and “no precise rules on the matter can be stated.”16
 As a practical matter, the power given to a senior class after default to direct the 
trustee could well be granted for the sole benefit of the senior investors. Comment d 
of the Restatement provides that “[a] power that is for the sole benefit of the person 
holding the power is not a fiduciary power.”17 Nonetheless, “the power holder must 
not abuse the power by exercising it in a manner that is harmful or indifferent to the 
interests of the other beneficiaries when such exercise is not reasonably related to the 
benefit intended for the power holder.”18 In most cases, however, a senior class directing 
the trustee, after default, to protect its interests would appear to be exercising its 
power in a manner reasonably related to the benefit intended for that class.
 Under the Restatement of Trusts, therefore, a conf licted trustee may well be 
required to comply with post-default power given to a senior class to direct the 
trustee. That is not the whole answer, though, because the Restatement of Trusts 
does not by its terms apply to commercial trusts. Part 1, Chapter 1 (Definitions and 
Distinctions) of the Restatement states, for example, that “[t]he Restatement of 
Trusts does not deal with such devices as . . . trusts used for purposes of security.”19 
Section 1, Comment b, of the Restatement reiterates that the “law relating to the use 
of a trust as a security device . . . is not within the scope of this Restatement.”20 
13. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Effect of Power to Control Acts of Trustee § 75 (2007) 
(emphasis added).
14. See id. cmt. e.
15. Id. cmt. c.
16. Id.
17. Id. cmt. d.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Restatement (Third) of Trusts pt. 1, ch. 1, introductory note (2003). 
20. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Scope of This Restatement § 1, cmt. b (2003). 
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Although “many” of the rules of the Restatement do apply, “different rules are often 
applicable.”21
 There is limited commercial trust case law on whether a conflicted trustee must 
comply with power given to a senior class after default to direct the trustee. In the 
leading case, Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co. was a successor collateral trustee for holders of defaulted bonds issued by a 
railway company.22 Mexico “for decades had had designs upon obtaining the 
collateral[.]”23 Mexico therefore “systematically purchased in excess of ninety-five 
percent of the bonds” and, as dominant bondholder, “had called for an auction” of 
the collateral.24 It was clear that Mexico, directly or indirectly, would purchase the 
collateral at the auction, and that given the absence of other bidders, the purchase 
price would plainly be the “upset,” or minimum, sale price set by the trustee. At the 
contractual direction of Mexico, the trustee set a very low minimum sale price for 
the collateral, without arranging for a fair third-party valuation. The court held that, 
“[g]iven this state of affairs, it was absolutely crucial to the interests of the trust 
beneficiaries as beneficiaries, as opposed to the interests of Mexico as a beneficiary/
prospective purchaser, that the collateral be fairly valued by a disinterested party.”25
 After Beck, a conflicted trustee thus appeared only to be required to comply with 
contractual directions if the trustee’s resulting actions would be fair to all investors 
for which the trustee acts. The recently decided Bank of New York case, in which the 
English High Court of Justice applied New York law, upheld the principles of the 
Beck case.26 In another case, Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, the court held that New York 
trust law exempts a directed trustee of a gratuitous trust from fiduciary responsibility 
only if the direction is “express and unambiguous; it cannot be implied.”27 A conflicted 
trustee therefore would appear to be required to comply with post-default power 
given to a senior class to direct the trustee if valuation and other matters affecting 
the recovery of subordinated investors are fair and the senior class’s power to direct 
the trustee is express and unambiguous.
 Assuming these should be the rules, how should a trustee make these 
determinations? As before, some trustees are seeking opinions of counsel, which are 
not always forthcoming. Some are seeking additional indemnification, which might 
not be enforceable and would not address reputational considerations. And some are 
21. Id.
22. 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (1st Dep’t 1995).
23. Id. at 529.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 529–30.
26. See Bank of N.Y., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594 at ¶¶ 59, 62.
27. 59 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (applying New York law). In Bank of New York I gave evidence, 
based on Fifth Ave. Bank, that even if the applicable security agreement could be read to give the senior 
noteholders the contractual right to direct the collateral trustee with respect to foreclosure, such a 
reading would, at best, be implied.
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seeking declaratory judgments, which are hard to obtain and can be expensive and 
time consuming. These are not efficient solutions.
iii. COnCLUsiOn
 The conflicted trustee dilemma is susceptible to legal solutions. To that end, besides 
the issues previously raised (including the very fundamental issue of how a conflicted 
trustee should attempt to balance its obligations to investors with conflicting interests),28 
there are several overarching issues that should be considered:
1.  Should there be different trustees for each class of securities? 
Requiring that would be very expensive, at least prior to default. 
It also begs the question of how different trustees should work 
together to make decisions affecting multiple classes. 
Furthermore, multiple trustees do not appear to make sense for a 
single collateral pool.
2.  To what extent should financing transactions be regulated to reduce 
conflicts, such as prohibiting interest-only and principal-only 
tranches or restricting senior-subordinated investment structures? 
The downside of regulation is that it would artificially restrict 
financing flexibility, potentially causing unintended consequences. 
For example, the senior-subordinate structure is universally 
recognized and, among other benefits, enables companies and 
investors to more precisely allocate risks to investment preferences. It 
also represents an effective substitute for third-party guaranties at a 
time when few third parties are of sufficient creditworthiness for 
their guaranties to be commercially meaningful.
3.  To what extent can trustee provisions be crafted to provide 
algorithmic or otherwise easy-to-follow rules to address conflicts? 
The problem here is that one can never predict all possible 
conflict issues and their permutations.
4.  To what extent would a Trust Indenture Act-type framework, 
requiring trustees to resign to avoid conf licts after default, 
balance norms and practicality? And, as a practical matter, can 
successor trustees always be found on reasonable terms and 
conditions (e.g., fees, indemnities)?
5.  Should the U.S. have a practical, declaratory judgment-type of 
judicial procedure to enable conflicted trustees to obtain needed 
directions? In the Bank of New York case, the trustee took its 
28. See supra text accompanying notes 6–11 (asking whether a duty of impartiality would be sufficient, or 
whether there should be more of a commercial balancing, such as that undertaken by directors of a 
corporation regarding the conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors).
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dilemma to the English High Court of Justice, Chancery 
Division, precisely because it offered such a procedure.
 These are all unanswered questions; but answers are worth pursuing to help 
overcome the current financial crisis and to prevent future crises.
